March 26, 2010
The phrase “Agile in the Large” is one I’ve heard used a number of times over the last year in discussions about scaling up agile delivery. I have to say that I’m not a fan, primarily because it entails some pretty significant ambiguity. That ambiguity arises from the implied question: Agile What in the Large? So far I have encountered two flavours of answer:
1.) Agile Practices in the Large
This is the common flavour. It involves the deployment of some kind of overarching programme container, e.g. RUP, which is basically used to facilitate the concurrent rollout of standard (or more often advanced) agile development practices.
2.) Agile Principles in the Large
This is the less common, but I believe much more valuable, flavour. It involves taking the principles for managing complexity that have been proven over the last ten years within the domain of software delivery and re-applying them to manage complexity in wider domains, in particular the generation of return from technology investment. That means:
- No more Big Upfront Design: putting an end to fixed five year plans and big-spend technology programmes, and instead adopting an incremental approach to both budgeting and investment (or even better, inspirationally recognising that budgeting is a form of waste and doing without it altogether – thanks to Dan North for the pointer)
- Incremental Delivery: in order to ensure investment liability (i.e. code that has yet to ship) is continually minimised
- Frequent, Rapid Feedback: treating analytics integration, A/B testing capabilites, instrumentation and alerting as a first order design concern
- Retrospectives and Adaptation: a test-and-learn product management culture aligned with an iterative, evolutionary approach to commercial and technical strategy
When it comes down to it, it seems to me that deploying cutting-edge agile development practices without addressing the associated complexities of the wider business context is really just showing off. It makes me think back to being ten years old and that kid at the swimming pool who was always getting told off by his parents “Yes Johnny I know you can do a double piked backflip, but forget all that for now – all I need you to do is enter the water without belly-flopping and emptying half the pool”.
June 2, 2009
An interesting article in the Wall Street Journal by the father of modern portfolio theory, Harry Markowitz, discussing the current financial crisis. He emphasises the need for diversification across uncorrelated risk as the key to minimising balanced portfolio risk, and highlights its lack as a major factor behind our present predicament. However to my mind this still begs a question of whether any risk can be truly uncorrelated in complex systems. Power law environments such as financial markets are defined by their interconnectedness, and the presence of positive and negative feedback loops which undermine their predictability. That interconnectedness makes identifying uncorrelated risk exceptionally problematic, especially when such correlations have been hidden inside repackaged derivatives and insurance products.
In systems that are intrinsically unpredictable, no risk management framework can ever tell us which decisions to make: that is essentially unknowable. Instead, good risk strategies should direct us towards minimising our liability, in order to minimise the cost of failure. If we consider “current liability” within the field of software product development as our investment in features that have yet to ship and prove their business value generation capabilities, then this gives us a clear, objective steer towards frequent iterative releases of minimum marketable featuresets and trying to incur as much cost as possible at the point of value generation (i.e. through Cloud platforms, open source software, etc). I think that is the real reason why agile methodologies have been so much more successful that traditional upfront-planning approaches: they allow organisations to be much more efficient at limiting their technology investment liability.
May 21, 2009
A guide to putting into practice a number of ideas that have been discussed on this blog over the last 18 months, especially with regards to MMF valuation (already incorporating a number of feedback iterations from different projects).
Download: Options Analysis User Guide 1.2
[update: uploaded latest version of PDF]
May 20, 2009
In the last post we argued for a more rigourous, quantitative approach to featureset valuation over the conventional, implicit and overly blunt mechanisms of product backlog prioritisation. We borrowed a simple valuation equation from decision tree analysis to give us a more powerful tool for both managing risk and determining the optimal exercise point for any MMF:
Value = (Estimated Generated Value * Estimated Risk) - Estimated Cost
Estimated Risk =
Estimated Project Risk *
Estimated Market Risk
A few comments are worth noting about this equation:
1.) It contains no time-dependent variable. The equation simply assumes a standard amortisation period to be agreed with stakeholders (typically 12 to 24 months). Market payback functions and similar are ignored as they introduce complexity and hence risk (as described in more detail below). We are not seeking accuracy per se, but simply enough accuracy to enable us to make the correct implementation decisions.
2.) It is very simplistic. Risk management must be reflexive: at the most basic level, project risk can be divided into two fundamental groupings:
- Model-independent risks
- Model-related risk
The former includes typical factors such as new technologies, staff quality and training, external project dependecies, etc. The latter includes two components: the inaccuracy of the risk model and the incomprehensibility of the risk model. We start incurring inaccuracy risk as soon as the simplicity of our model is so great that it leads us to make bad decisions or else provides no guidance. MoSCoW prioritisation is a good example of this. On the other hand we start incurring incomprehensibility risk as soon as the risk model is so complex that it is no longer comprehensible by everyone in the delivery team (which will clearly be relative across different teams). The current financial crisis is a large-scale example of a collapse in incomprehensibility risk management. If financial risk models had been reflexive and taken their own complexity into account as a risk factor, then there is no way we would have ended up with situations where cumulative liabilities were only even vaguely understood by financial maths PhDs: if we take a team of twenty people, it is clear that a sophisticated and accurate model that is only understood by one person entails vastly more risk than a simplistic, less accurate model that everyone can follow. We can generalise this in our estimation process as follows:
Total Risk = Project Risk * Market Risk * Model Incomprehensibility Risk * Model Inaccuracy Risk
or as functions:
Total Risk = Risk(Project) * Risk(Market) * Risk(Incomprehensibility(Model)) * Risk(Inaccuracy(Model))
Furthermore, given our general human tendency towards overcomplexity for most situations this can be approximated to
Total Risk = Risk(Project) * Risk(Market) * Risk(Incomprehensibility(Model))
3.) All risk is assigned as a multiplier against Generated Value, rather than treating delivery risk as an inverse multiplier of Cost. I have had very interesting conversations about this recently with both Chris Matts and some of the product managers I am working with. They have suggested a more accurate valuation might be some variation of:
Value = (Estimated Generated Value * Estimated Realisation Risk) - (Estimated Cost / Estimated Delivery Risk)
In other words, risks affecting technical delivery should result in a greater risk-adjusted cost rather than a lesser risk-adjusted revenue. This is probably more accurate. However is that level of accuracy necessary? In my opinion at least, no. Firstly it creates a degree of confusion as regards how to differentiate revenue realisation risk and delivery risk: is your marketing campaign launch really manifestly different in risk terms from your software release? If either fails it is going to blow the return on investment model, so I would say fundamentally no. Secondly, I might be wrong but I got the feeling that part of the reticence to accept the simpler equation from our product management was a preference against their revenue forecasts being infected by a thing over which they had no control: namely delivery risk (perhaps a reflection of our general psychological tendency to perceive greater risk in situations where we have no control). However that is a major added benefit in my opinion: it helps break down the traditional divides between “the business” and “IT”. As the technology staff of Lehman Brothers will now no doubt attest, the only people who aren’t part of “the business” are the people who work for someone else.
For me, this approach creates the missing link between high-level project business cases and the MMF backlog. We start with a high-level return on investment model in the business case, that then gets factored down into componentised return on investement models as part of the MMF valuation process. These ROI components effectively comprise the business level acceptance tests for the business case. The componentised ROI models then drive out the MMF acceptance tests, from which we define our unit tests and then start development. In this way, we complete the chain of red-gree-refactor cycles from the highest level of commercial strategy down to unit testing a few lines of code. The scale invariance of this approach I find particularly aestheticly pleasing: it is red-green-refactor for complex systems…